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When there are two or more adjectives that are from the same group, the word and is placed between the two adjectives:
When there are three or more adjectives from the same adjective group, place a comma between each of the coordinate adjectives:
A comma is not placed between an adjective and the noun.
Order of adjectives – examples
Order of adjectives exercises
- white and large
- large and white
- large white
- We took a ride on a blue, old Chinese bus.
- We took a ride on a Chinese, old, blue bus.
- We took a ride on an old, blue Chinese bus.
- I’d like three good reasons why you don’t like spinach.
- I’d like a good three reasons why you don’t like spinach.
- I’d like good reasons three why you don’t like spinach.
- I like that really big red old antique tractor in the museum.
- I like that really big old red antique tractor in the museum.
- I like that old, red, really big antique tractor in the museum.
- My brother rode a beautiful big black Friesian horse in the parade.
- My brother rode a beautiful Friesian big black horse in the parade.
- My brother rode a big, black, beautiful Friesian horse in the parade.
- My grandmother lives in the ________________________ house on the corner
- little blue, green and white
- little blue and green and white
- little, blue, green, and white
- The store carries an assortment of _____________________ objects.
- interesting new, old and antique
- new, old, interesting and antique
- interesting, old and new and antique
- We went for a two-week cruise on a __________________________ ocean liner.
- incredible brand-new, huge Italian
- incredible, huge, brand-new Italian
- Italian incredible, brand-new, huge
Answers: A – little blue, green and white B – interesting new, old and antique C – incredible, huge, brand-new Italian
- I bought a pair of _________________ boots.
- new, nice, red rain
- nice new red rain
- red nice new rain
- My dad was thrilled with his gift of ______________________ bowties for his clown act.
- three squirting new nice big polka-dotted
- three polka-dotted nice new squirting
- three nice big new polka-dotted squirting
- Please put the marbles into that ______________________ box.
- round little old red
- little old round red
- little old red round
Answers: A – nice new red rain B – three nice big new polka-dotted squirting C – little old round red
- I was surprised to receive a __________________ puppy for my birthday.
- little, cute, eight-week-old golden retriever
- cute eight-week-old little golden retriever
- cute little eight-week-old golden retriever
- Our work uniform consists of black pants, black shoes, and a ________________ shirt.
- yellow baggy big polo
- big baggy yellow polo
- baggy yellow big polo
- I’ve been spending a lot of time in antique shops looking for the perfect _______________ clock.
- little silver Italian cuckoo
- little Italian silver cuckoo
- silver little Italian cuckoo
- Our grandparents drive a motorhome with black and white stripes.
- Our grandparents drive a motorhome with black with white stripes.
- Our grandparents drive a motorhome with black, white stripes.
- During my college years, I wore a red, white and black big hat to sporting events.
- During my college years, I wore a big red, white and black hat to sporting events.
- During my college years, I wore a big red white and black, hat to sporting events.
Answers: A – cute little eight-week-old golden retriever B – big baggy yellow polo C – little silver Italian cuckoo
Trump’s Law and Order Versus the Rule of Law
On the stump and during his acceptance speech at last week’s Republican National Convention, Donald Trump declared himself “the law-and-order candidate.” In using this term, Trump signals support for the vigorous use of force against potential criminals, terrorists, and undocumented immigrants. Trump’s law and order also carries a not-at-all-veiled racial sub-text. He will use the law to impose order on “them” (undocumented immigrants, African Americans protesting racially biased policing, Muslims) in order to protect “us” (white Americans).
Trump’s law-and-order message does not just carry racist overtones. It also rests on falsehoods. Despite some local fluctuations, the violent crime rate in America remains substantially lower than it has been in decades. Meanwhile, undocumented immigrants account for a tiny fraction of the violent crime that does occur. And Trump’s vilification of all Muslims because of the terrorist acts of a tiny minority is both profoundly unAmerican and counter-productive.
Fact-checking Donald Trump is both child’s play and beside the point. His strong-man campaign rests not on facts or sober policy analysis, but on scaring people into trusting him to take tough—albeit mostly unspecified—action. For example, when FBI crime statistics were cited to debunk Trump’s claims that we are re-living the crime wave of the 1960s-1990s, his campaign manager questioned the FBI’s credibility because its director, James Comey, failed to recommend that Hillary Clinton be prosecuted for her use of a private email server while Secretary of State. If Trump predicted sunshine and it rained instead, his campaign would blame Clinton’s emails, the media, Mexico, Muslims, or Black Lives Matter.
Nonetheless, Trump’s proclamation of law and order should not go unexamined. After all, anyone who is not an anarchist favors both law and order. So what, exactly, is wrong with “law and order”? To answer that question, we can usefully distinguish between the idiomatic use of “law and order” and the cherished value of the rule of law.
Rule of Law
Experts disagree about the precise scope of the concept of the rule of law. As legal philosopher Jeremy Waldron has written, the rule of law is “a multi-faceted ideal.” Its facets include certainty, predictability, even-handedness, impartiality, procedural fairness, and more.
Some aspects of the rule of law can come into conflict with one another in concrete cases. For example, strict application of rules without the occasional creation of ad hoc exceptions fosters predictability, but may undermine even-handedness when the rule maker fails to anticipate how a one-size-fits-all rule unfairly lumps together some people who are not similarly situated. Accordingly, just as reasonable people can and do disagree over what any particular law requires in close cases, so they can disagree over what the rule of law requires in such cases.
But just as the existence of twilight does not mean that there is no distinction between day and night, so the indeterminacy around the edges of the concept of the rule of law does not render it meaningless through and through. At its core, the rule of law stands in contrast to what is sometimes called the rule of men. As Waldron explains, most fundamentally, the rule of law requires “that people in positions of authority should exercise their power within a constraining framework of public norms, rather than on the basis of their own preferences . . . .”
Presidents and the Rule of Law
During various episodes in American history, presidents have said or done things that arguably violated rule-of-law principles. For instance, in response to a Supreme Court decision in favor of the Cherokee, Andrew Jackson purportedly said (but probably did not actually say): Chief Justice “John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it.”
More sympathetically, Abraham Lincoln argued that even if he lacked the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus without an act of Congress, the nation’s very survival depended on temporarily sacrificing the rule of law. In an 1861 address to Congress, he famously posed the following rhetorical question: “are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?”
Trump Echoes Nixon
In his own inartful way, Donald Trump has suggested that, like Lincoln before him, he should be permitted to take liberties with the Constitution in order to save the nation. In a recent interview Trump defended his proposal to stop immigration from (unspecified) “terrorist” countries with the claim that the Constitution “doesn’t necessarily give us the right to commit suicide as a country.” As law professor Josh Blackman has noted, this line paraphrases a famous dissent by Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson. More broadly, the notion that “the Constitution is not a suicide pact” is frequently invoked by people who propose sweeping action that seemingly violates the Constitution on grounds of national emergency.
Trump’s implicit suggestion that the nation faces an existential crisis of the sort that confronted Lincoln cannot be taken seriously. Indeed, as noted above, there is much less violent crime in America now than there was the last time that a GOP nominee ran as a law-and-order candidate. Yet if Trump’s echo of Richard Nixon is unwarranted by the facts, it is also chilling.
Nixon abused the office of the presidency by seeking to use its public powers for his own personal and political ends. He compiled an “enemies list” of political opponents and journalists deemed unfriendly, and sought IRS audits, denial of government contracts, and prosecutions based on the list.
But at least Nixon knew enough to try to keep his enemies list secret. Trump, by contrast, has made no effort to disguise the fact that he would use the power of the presidency to settle scores and advance his own personal agenda. At the Convention, New-Jersey-Governor-turned-Trump-footman Chris Christie incited the GOP faithful with a speech purporting to try Hillary Clinton for supposed crimes. It should go without saying, but I will say anyway, that in mature democracies, candidates for office do not threaten to jail their political opponents.
From Nixon to Trump
To be sure, one can favor law and order in the sense of tough-on-crime policies without threatening the core of the rule of law. Yes, our two most aggressively law-and-order presidential candidates—Nixon and Trump—also undermined the rule of law by abusing (in Nixon’s case) or promising to abuse (in Trump’s case) the powers of the presidency for personal goals. But maybe that is a mere coincidence. Perhaps a platform of law and order does not inherently threaten the rule of law.
Perhaps, but I am skeptical. Even after he left office, Nixon famously displayed a remarkable view of the scope of presidential power when he told David Frost that “when the president does it that means that it is not illegal.” Although technically speaking about foreign affairs, where there are fewer constitutional constraints on presidential power than domestically, Nixon’s sweeping statement was consistent with his record on domestic affairs as well.
Trump, meanwhile, confuses the public with the personal in other ways. He has thoroughly mixed his campaign with his business enterprises. For example, his campaign rents space from his businesses. Meanwhile, Melania Trump’s plagiarism from Michelle Obama occurred because a Trump Organization writer with no relevant experience was given duties ordinarily assigned to political professionals. And most troublingly, Trump has shown no interest in ensuring that his business interests would be run separately from the White House should he win the election. Like Nixon before him, only more so, Trump seems to view the presidency as personal spoils for the victor, rather than a public trust.
Rule by Law
Might the “law” part of Trump’s promise of law-and-order nonetheless support some of the ideal of the rule of law? Don’t count on it. Although “law and order” and “rule of law” both contain the word “law,” the concepts are quite different, as illustrated by Trump’s history with the legal system.
Trump appears to be both the most litigious person and the most sued person ever to be nominated for the presidency by a major party—and by a very large margin. A USA Today investigation last month found that Trump or his companies were the plaintiff in roughly 1,900 lawsuits and that Trump was the defendant in roughly 1,300. What could possibly explain these numbers?
The short answer is that Trump likes to use the law as a cudgel, frequently filing or threatening baseless lawsuits to intimidate those who cross him—as he did just last week when his lawyers sent a cease-and-desist letter to the co-author/ghost-writer of Trump’s The Art of the Deal for daring to go public with an expression of remorse for having helped create the Trump myth.
Meanwhile, Trump so often finds himself a defendant because of his standard business modus operandi: He stiffs contractors, lenders, and others whom he owes money, hoping that they will not have the wherewithal to sue. The fact that Trump has persisted in this unscrupulous business practice for decades suggests that he often gets away with it. Thus, the 1,300 lawsuits against him may substantially understate his contempt for his legal obligations.
Taken together, Trump’s quickness to bring or threaten suit and his disregard of his legal obligations paint a picture of someone who regards the law as a useful tool to coerce others but not a restraint on his own behavior.
As a private businessman, his attitude is despicable but the damage is limited. Savvy actors—like the major banks that no longer lend Trump money—can guard against Trump’s chicanery. Caveat trumptor.
Yet, should Trump become president, no one would be safe from his toxic mix of bullying through law and acting above the law. He would replace rule of law with what Chinese scholars call rule by law.
What’s the difference? Authoritarians use law to rule over people but do not subject themselves to law’s constraints.
In borrowing a distinction that figures in debates over the law’s place in the People’s Republic of China, I realize that I am comparing Trump to (nominally communist) authoritarians. I do not make the comparison lightly. Trump has publicly stated his admiration for brutal former dictators like Saddam Hussein and Moammar Qaddafi. He criticized Mikhail Gorbachev for being insufficiently authoritarian by comparison with the Chinese leaders who cracked down on the nascent movement for democracy in 1989.
Thus, calling Trump an authoritarian is understatement, not hyperbole. His conception of law and order is antithetical to the rule of law.
Order Protection Rule
DEFINITION of ‘Order Protection Rule’
The order protection rule is one of the provisions of the Regulation National Market System. The rule is meant to ensure that investors receive an execution price that is equivalent to what is being quoted on any other exchange where the security is traded. The rule eliminates the possibility of orders being traded through, which means executed at a suboptimal price.
The order protection rule requires that each exchange establishes and enforces policies to ensure consistent price quotation for all NMS stocks, which include those on the major stock exchanges as well as many over-the-counter (OTC) stocks.
The order protection rule is also known as «Rule 611», or the «trade-through rule.»
BREAKING DOWN ‘Order Protection Rule’
The order protection rule – along with Regulation NMS as a whole — was instituted to make financial markets more liquid and transparent. Before the regulation was passed, existing «trade-through» rules did not protect investors at all times. This was especially true on limit trades where investors would sometimes get inferior prices to those being quoted on a different exchange.
The rule aims to protect quotations for a given security across the board, so all market participants can receive the best possible execution price for orders that can be executed immediately.
Regulation NMS was passed in 2005 by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
The order protection rule also established the National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) requirement that mandates brokers to route order to venues that offer the best displayed price.
Criticism Of The Order Protection Rule
Critiques of the order protection rule’s effectiveness have arisen in the years following its enactment. Those criticisms include some belief that the rule contributed to excess fragmentation among trading venues. This was implied to have increased the complexity of the market and the connectivity costs to participants in the market. For example, trade-through restrictions can force market participants to route orders to lit venues they would otherwise not do business with.
Another criticism of the rule is that it may have indirectly led to an increase in dark trading, a practice where stock is bought and sold in such a way that it does not materially affect the market. This has been attributed to limits imposed on competition among lit venues with choices being made based on their speed and fees instead of stability and liquidity.
Critics have also cited the order protection rule for potentially harming institutional investors who need to make large volume trades but are forced to access small-sized quotations. This has the effect of tipping off short-term proprietary traders to the trading intentions of institutional investors.
The new changes to Roberts Rule of Order and why it matters
Many organizations establish in there by-laws that the Board of Directors must use Robert’s Rules of Order as its parliamentary authority to conduct meetings and do the business of the company, non-profit or religious organization. Because of this, it is very important to recognize and follow the revised 11th edition of Robert’s Rules of Order to ensure that your board and membership meetings are being conducted consistently with your parliamentary authority. This new edition contains more than 100 substantive changes in parliamentary procedure. The following are three key changes in Robert’s Rules 11th edition that organizations need to know about as outlined by Richard Hammer in his Church and Tax Law e-newsletter with respect the same:
1. Disciplinary matters.
The first significant change is a thorough revision of Chapter XX, Disciplinary Procedures, including more detailed treatment of removal of officers and trials as well as expanded provisions on remedies for abuse of authority by the chair in a meeting and on handling disruptions by members.
This change illustrates a fundamental flaw that has persisted in recent editions of Robert’s Rules of Order Newly Revised. Henry Robert’s purpose in compiling his original Robert’s Rules of Order in 1876 was to provide a body of rules to assist organizations in conducting meetings with order, decorum, consistency, and efficiency. The original work was devoted entirely to an explanation of these rules. Its table of contents included two parts: rules of order and conduct of business. But subsequent editions of Robert’s Rules of Order have introduced several new subjects pertaining to matters of church governance and administration rather than parliamentary procedure. Matters of church governance and administration are addressed in a church’s bylaws or, in some cases, in the nonprofit corporation law under which a church is incorporated. For instance, church bylaws almost always define a quorum for both board and membership meetings, a quorum being the minimum number of members present in order for business to be transacted. If a church’s bylaws fail to designate a quorum, then the state nonprofit corporation law under which the church is incorporated will define a quorum. It is almost inconceivable that Robert’s Rules of Order Newly Revised will ever be the authority that defines a quorum in meetings of a church’s board or members.
Many of these new, expanded topics in Robert’s Rules of Order Newly Revised have nothing to do with parliamentary procedure and therefore their inclusion in the new edition not only is inappropriate, but creates needless confusion due to the inevitable conflicts that will arise between a church’s bylaws and its parliamentary authority.
Note the following two rules of construction:
Rule 1. A church’s bylaws take precedence over conflicting provisions in Robert’s Rules of Order Newly Revised, since bylaws are a higher legal authority and are superseded only by a church’s charter (articles of incorporation) and in some cases by a church’s constitution and denominational rules.
Rule 2. Any provision in Robert’s Rules of Order Newly Revised that does not pertain to parliamentary procedure exceeds the purpose of Robert’s Rules and is superseded by conflicting provisions in a church’s charter, constitution, or bylaws.
This rule is illustrated by the following example:
Example. A church’s bylaws specify that the quorum for annual membership meetings is “20 percent” of all members. State nonprofit corporation law under which the church is incorporated specifies that a quorum is 10 percent of members. Robert’s Rules of Order Newly Revised specifies that the quorum in church meetings “consists of those who attend.” This is a perfect example of the impropriety of Robert’s Rules of Order Newly Revised addressing issues of governance in addition to rules of parliamentary procedure. The definition of a quorum in Robert’s Rules of Order Newly Revised is irrelevant. The operative quorum is the 20 percent specified in the church’s bylaws.
How should church leaders determine the governing document when there is a conflict in the various sources of authority? Consider the previous example of a church that is trying to determine the quorum requirement for its annual business meeting. Its bylaws specify 20 percent, the applicable nonprofit corporation statute says 10 percent, and Robert’s Rules of Order Newly Revised says “those who attend.” It’s easy to see how these conflicts can lead to needless confusion and uncertainty. Some may challenge the legality of a meeting based on noncompliance with one or more of these sources of authority.
In the church quorum example, the highest ranked authority would be the church’s bylaws, meaning that the applicable quorum is 20 percent of all members. So, a meeting at which 12 percent of members attend would not satisfy the quorum requirement even though it would satisfy the quorum definition under the state nonprofit corporation law and Robert’s Rules.
2. Small boards
The latest edition contains a revision of the content of modified parliamentary rules in small boards and in committees, together with recognition that a small assembly may wish to employ these less formal procedures.
The previous edition of Robert’s Rules of Order Newly Revised contained a few important changes in the conduct of “small boards” which it defined as those “where there are not more than about a dozen members present.” Since most church boards have fewer than “about a dozen” members, these relaxed rules apply. In practice, few persons who preside over church board meetings have any idea that relaxed rules apply, much less what these rules are.
The previous (10th) edition of Robert’s Rules of Order Newly Revised contained the following relaxed rules for small meetings (additional changes made for these in the 11th edition are noted in parenthesis):
Motions to close or limit debate are not allowed.
Members can engage in “informal discussion” of a matter while no motion is pending. This contravenes the basic parliamentary principle that the only way to bring business before a deliberative body in through motions.
On routine and unimportant matters for which there is no apparent opposition, the chair can take action by “unanimous consent” by stating, “If there is no objection” the matter is decided upon. Unanimous consent is not limited, however, to small boards. It is often used in larger deliberative bodies. So, it is unclear why this is listed as one of the different rules that applies to small boards.
The chair need not rise when putting questions to a vote.
Members are not required to obtain recognition from the chair before making motions or speaking. (In the 11th edition, Robert’s Rules adds that members can obtain the floor by raising a hand).
Members can make motions and speak while seated.
Motions need not be seconded.
There is no limit on the number of times a member can speak on a question, or the length of each speech. This is an exception to the standard parliamentary rule that members are limited to two speeches of ten minutes each on the same question in the same day. (In the 11th edition, it clarifies that members can only speak on debatable questions).
Informal discussion of a subject is permitted while no motion is pending.
Matters can be handled by common consent (without a motion) if there is no anticipated objection.
Votes on motions can be taken initially by a show of hands.
The chair can speak in discussion without rising or leaving the chair, and subject to rule or custom, may make motions and vote on all questions. (In the 11th edition, the chair may initiate informal discussion, which allows him or her to submit proposals without formally making a motion (although motions are always acceptable)).
3. Electronic meetings
The latest edition provides a new subsection on “electronic meetings,” with substantially expanded treatment of the topic.
The new edition devotes three pages to “electronic meetings,” up from one paragraph in the 10th edition. Here are some of the main points in the 11th edition:
(1) in general
Business can only be conducted in a properly called meeting, defined as “a single official gathering of members in one room or area to transaction business.” The new edition of Robert’s Rules of Order Newly Revised clarifies that a church’s bylaws can authorize the conduct of official meetings of members in electronic meetings “at which, rather than all participating members being physically present in one room or area as in traditional (face-to-face) meetings, some or all of them communicate with the others through electronic means such as the Internet or by telephone.” A meeting conducted by electronic means “does not lose its character as a deliberative assembly so long as the meetings provide, at a minimum, conditions of opportunity for simultaneous aural communications among all participating members equivalent to those of meetings held in one room or area. Under such conditions, an electronic meeting that is properly authorized by the bylaws is treated as though it were a meeting at which all the members who are participating are actually present.”
Key point. Membership meetings in most churches are too large to be conducted by electronic means. As a result, the option of electronic meetings will have the most relevance to board and committee meetings consisting of a smaller number of participants.
Robert’s Rules of Order Newly Revised stresses that electronic meetings are allowed only if authorized by an organization’s bylaws. This statement is incomplete, since it omits any reference to applicable state nonprofit corporation law. Incorporated churches can provide for electronic meetings in their bylaws only if authorized by the applicable nonprofit corporation statute. In most states, nonprofit corporation laws have been revised in recent years to allow boards to meet electronically. Church leaders should be familiar with the wording of their state nonprofit corporation law’s treatment of electronic meetings before amending the church’s bylaws to provide for such meetings.
Robert’s Rules of Order Newly Revised recommends that churches wanting to authorize electronic meetings of boards and committees consider addressing the following issues in either the bylaws or standing rules:
the type of equipment required for participation in meetings;
contingencies for technical difficulties or malfunctions;
determination of a quorum;
how to raise a point of order challenging the continuing existence of a quorum;
how to seek recognition and obtain the floor;
how motions are to be submitted in writing;
methods for taking and verifying votes;
provisions for ensuring that nonmembers do not participate, especially in the case of special meetings in which confidential information will be shared.
Key point. Note that secret ballots generally are not possible in electronic meetings, which may make such meetings inadvisable in some cases.
Answers: A – large and white B – large white